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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
TANJA RYNHART, : Case No. 20040115-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
This Court granted certiorari to review State v. Rynhart, 2003 UT App 410, 81 P.3d 
814. A copy of the opinion is attached to the State's Brief of Petitioner [Petitioner Br.]. In 
addition to the facts and argument contained in its opening brief, the State submits the 
following in reply to defendant's responsive brief [Respondent Br.] 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON 
PROPERTY PRINCIPALS 
Defendant claims that for Fourth Amendment purposes "[t]here are two situations 
where a vehicle may be considered abandoned. The first is statutorily [citing Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-116.10 (West2004)] and the second is factually" (Respondent Br. at 5-6). This 
is incorrect. 
Section 41-6-116.10 defines when an unattended vehicle may be presumed legally 
abandoned for purposes of the traffic code. See Addendum A (statues). The section 
establishes a set time after which a vehicle—even if otherwise legally parked—may be seized 
and removed by the police. See Add. A. Subsections (l)(b) & (4), for example, would permit 
police seizure and impound of a locked vehicle left in a campground parking lot for more 
than seven days. Subsection (l)(a) & (4) would allow the seizure and impound of any 
vehicle left on the highway for more than 48 hours, even if the vehicle was locked and out 
of traffic. Section 41-6-116.10, however, has no applicability here. 
In this case, it is undisputed that defendant left her vehicle on another's property 
following an accident. Whether as a result of intoxication or bad weather, defendant drove 
her minivan over a street curb, down an embankment, through two livestock fences, and into 
a marsh (R.72: 3; R73: 10, 14). Without notifying the property owner of the damage or 
leaving an identifying note on her vehicle, defendant illegally left the scene of the accident 
(R72: 4-5). See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-32 (West 2004) (requiring a driver involved in an 
accident to directly notify the property owner of damage or to attach a note identifying the 
driver in a "conspicuous place") {Add. A)} She left the van's doors unlocked, left a 
briefcase on the front seat, left her purse on the front floor, and left a partially full bottle of 
vodka between the front seats (R72: 4-5; R73: 10). 
It is uncontested that after the vehicle was discovered, the owner of the field wanted 
it removed. See Utah Code Ann. § 45-6-102.7 (West 2004) (recognizing that a real property 
defendant protests she did not need to comply with the statutory requirement 
because it was "unlikely that her identity would remain a mystery" and it was 
"unrealistic" to expect her to "write her name and address on a piece of paper [and] attach 
it on a conspicuous place" {Respondent Br. at 7-8). Given the conspicuous place she left 
the vehicle, attaching an identifying note was a small requirement. 
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owner may authorize the removal of a vehicle on his property). The van had been left 
unattended in the middle of the marsh for at least five and one-half hours (R72: 4). The 
police arranged for the van to be towed and kept "safe" until the vehicle's owner could be 
located (R72: 6). 
More significantly, the statutory definition of an "abandoned" vehicle for purposes 
of the traffic code is not determinative of the constitutional question here—that is, did 
defendant forfeit a reasonable expectation that her minivan and personal effects would be 
free from intrusion when she left the wrecked vehicle unlocked and her personal effects in 
open view in a privately-owned field following an accident involving property damage? 
As discussed in Petitioner Br. at 8-9, proper Fourth Amendment analysis is not 
dependent on property laws and concepts. Instead, the constitutional protection derives from 
society's recognition of the reasonableness of an individual's expectation that her property 
or effects will be free from outside intrusion. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967). Accord Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 & 142 n.12 (1978). When an 
individual relinquishes her legal interests in property, that is, her propriety and possessory 
interests, she necessarily also relinquishes her constitutional interest. Cf. Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 142 n. 12. The reverse is not true. An individual may forfeit a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in property while fully maintaining her property rights in an object. See Katz, 389 
U.S. at 3 51. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the distinction in a case in which 
a briefcase was left inside a vehicle that had suddenly caught fire on the side of the highway: 
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When one leaves a suitcase in an airport baggage claim area, he leaves it in a 
place where there is normally some measure of security. It is reasonable to 
expect that checked luggage will be locked up, if not claimed within a 
reasonable time, and will be kept safe until the person holding the claim check 
comes to retrieve it. One who chooses to leave luggage in an unlocked 
bumed-out automobile at that side of a highway in the country can fairly be 
thought to have a much lower expectation of privacy . . . Flaming cars do tend 
to attract a certain amount of attention. Flames may keep people at a 
respectful distance for a time, but fires eventually die out; and a fire-ravaged 
automobile, left unprotected in the open countryside invites just the kind of 
examination [the defendant] feared his would receive. 
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 667 (6th Cir. 1986). Likewise, here, a vehicle in the 
middle of a marsh reasonably invites examination. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT 
THAT HER VEHICLE WAS NOT FREELY ACCESSIBLE 
Defendant admits that any passer-by, including the field's owner, had physical access 
to her vehicle during the five-plus hours it was left unlocked in the marsh. See Respondent 
Br. at 8. Defendant claims, however, that if the passer-by opened the unlocked doors and 
looked inside her purse and briefcase, the passer-by would be guilty of criminal trespass or 
vehicle burglary. See id. Defendant claims that, consequently, the police were not entitled 
to access the interior. See id. Again, defendant's argument ignores proper Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
Defendant's initial factual predicate is incorrect. Vehicle burglary requires an 
unlawful entry coupled with an "intent to commit a felony or theft." See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-204 (West 2004) (defining vehicle burglary as an unlawful entry coupled with "intent 
to commit a felony or theft) {Add. A.). Similarly, criminal trespass requires that an unlawful 
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entry be coupled with an intent to annoy or injure a person, damage property, or otherwise 
commit a theft or felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (West 2004) (Add. A). A passer-
by who, following an accident, enters an unlocked unattended vehicle and opens a purse and 
briefcase to discern the identity of the driver—as the officer did here—is not guilty of a 
crime. The passer-by is simply a Good Samaritan. 
Contrary to defendant's characterization of the State's argument, a defendant does not 
lose all expectations of privacy whenever she forgets to lock a door. See Respondent Br. at 
8-9. Nor can the police search anytime they have physical access to a place. See Respondent 
Br. at 8. But when a defendant fails to take normal precautionary measures to protect her 
property from intrusion and leaves it unlocked in a field accessible by any person, she cannot 
claim that the property is nevertheless constitutionally protected. 
The objective facts control; defendant's subjective intent is irrelevant. See Oliver v. 
UnitedStates, 466U.S. 170,182-83(1984); United States v. Tugwell, 125F.3d600,602(8th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Indeed, courts 
often presume that a defendant harbors a hope that no governmental intrusion will occur 
before the property is retrieved. See Oswald, 783 F. 2d at 667-668. But that fact is not 
controlling. Instead, the determining factor is whether defendant's actions would lead object 
"a reasonable person in the searching officer's position" to believe that defendant forfeited 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in the item to be searched. See United States v. Pitts, 
322 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 2003). To answer that question, courts look "solely to the 
external manifestations of the defendant's intent as judged by a reasonable person possessing 
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the same knowledge available to the government agents involved in the search." Id. 
The totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining if an object is 
constitutionally protected. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78. Objects openly exposed to the 
public or in a place freely accessible to the public are not private. See id. at 178-79 (refusing 
to accord objects and activity in open fields constitutional protection). Unlocked objects are 
generally not accorded the same protection as locked objects. Cf United States v. Basinski, 
226 F.3d 829, 827 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a defendant has a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in a locked briefcase hidden in a private place). If the circumstances surrounding 
the object invite inspection, less privacy is accorded. See Oswald, 783 F.2d at 677 (holding 
that a burning car on the side of the road invites inspection by police and any one passing 
by). And if an object is physically relinquished, it is accorded less protection even if its 
owner intends to later reclaim it. See United States v. Baisinski, 226 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 
2000). In sum, "'what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. '"See California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). 
Here, the totality of circumstances establish that a reasonable person would not expect 
an unlocked van to be free from intrusion if left for hours in someone else's field. See 
Petitioner Br., Statement of Facts at 4-6. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in this and the State's opening brief, the Court should reverse 
couri o\ appeals aiu; ...:i.;:; ,:.L ....;. . •.:.-. • ,.,u. ...... -.T\ oi\:.i JCH} .;,L; vijkik.uw > 
- ^.:-iv.. ''•. • :*u-? .'-. ..'*!.. ;: ' \ :vi..mdM !. th. J- irici Lvrt foi tual. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of March, 2005. 
MARK I.. Mil R I [JEFF 
Utah Atti - iicy (iaieral 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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Addendum A 
§ 4 1 - 6 - 3 2 . Collision with unattended vehicle or other property—Duties of 
operator—Penalty 
(l)(a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with or is involved in. an 
accident with any vehicle or other property that is unattended and that results, 
in damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and shall: 
(i) locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle.or the owner,of 
other property of the operator's name and address and the registration 
number of the vehicle causing the damage; or 
(ii) attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other 
property a written notice giving the operator's name and address and the 
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage, 
(b) If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections 
41-6-31(2) and (3), 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§ 41—6—102.7. Removal of unattended vehicles prohibited without authori-
zation—Penalties 
(1) In cases not amounting to burglaiy or theft of a vehicle, .«. -.-J son may not 
remove an unattended vehicle without prior authorization of: 
(a) a peace officer; 
(b) a law enforcement agency; 
(c) a highway authority, as defined under Section 72-1-102, having juris-
diction over the highway on which there is an unattended vehicle; or 
(d) the owner or person in lawful possession or control of the real proper-
ty -
(2)(a) An authorization from a person specified under Subsecu«:-: i • 
or (c) shall be in a form specified by the Motor Vehicle Division. 
(b) The removal of the unattended vehicle shall comply with requirements 
of Section 41-6-102.5. 
(3) The removal of the unattended vehicle authorized under Si lbsecuoii I 
shall comply with requirements of Section 72-9-603. 
(4)'A person who violates Subsections (1) or (3) is guilty of a class^ "C 
misdemeanor. 
§ 41—6-116.10. Abandoned vehicles—Removal by peace officer—Report— 
Vehicle identification 
As used in this section, "abandoned vehicle" means a vehicle that is left 
unattended: 
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 48 hours; or 
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven days 
without express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful posses-
sion or control of the property. 
(2) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any highway. 
(3) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any public or private property 
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful 
possession or control of the property. 
(4) A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a vehicle has 
been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be removed in accor-
dance with Section 41-6-102.5.~ 
(5) If the motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark of 
the abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or obliterated, the vehicle may 
not be released or sold until the original motor number, manufacturer's 
number or identification mark has been replaced* or until a new number 
assigned by the Motor Vehicle Division has been stamped on the vehicle. 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 4 . Burglary of a vehicle—Charge of other offense 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with intent to commit a 
felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection (1) shall not 
preclude a charge for a commission of any other offense. 
a 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 6 . Criminal trespass 
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter'1 means inti usiori of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 
or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and; 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; oi 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he entei s or remains : ii 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obvioi '. - •.*.]*.'•-
or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intrud-
ers; or 
(c) he enters a condominium unit in \ iolation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it \\ as 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; 
and 
(b) actor's conduct did not si lbstantial 1} interfere w ith the ownei ' s i :i se of 
the property. 

